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
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[Vietnam: No significant ground action was reported on 19-20 November in South Vietnam.

Hanoi radio announced on 15 November the formation of a province-level liberation committee for Kien Phong Province in South Vietnam. This committee was reportedly organized on 17 October at a congress of representatives from the provincial National Liberation Front committee and other local organizations. This brings the total of provincial liberation committees publicly claimed by the Viet Cong to six. The others are in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Pleiku, Kontum, and An Xuyen.


The organization of liberation committees at the district and provincial level is not supposed to take place, according to enemy directives, until village liberation committees for that particular locality have been basically organized. Consequently, it is likely that at least those provinces publicly claiming liberation committees at the province level have also established such committees in the majority of their villages and districts. [REDACTED]

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
Communist China: Tighter security measures are being taken to reduce the flow of information in and out of the country.



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Border police are looking both for printed matter and for evidence of espionage. Inside Kwangtung, travelers are encountering more frequent and intensive police checks in hotels, on the road, and even in private homes.

This tightening of security controls reflects the upsurge of xenophobia that has been evident for some months, and a greater ability to enforce security measures now that a semblance of order has been restored.



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Tanzania: President Nyerere may have begun at long last to assert his constitutional authority over the recalcitrant, mismanaged government of Zanzibar.

Yesterday morning--in an unprecedented, surprise exercise--paramilitary police responsible to Dar es Salaam quietly and efficiently seized control of the town of Zanzibar. They were soon reinforced by Zanzibar Army units. Foreigners, including Chinese military advisers and the small US Consulate staff, were confined to their homes and offices until the operation ended.

Ever since the union of Zanzibar with mainland Tanzania in 1964, the island government under Vice President Karume and the radical Revolutionary Council has been virtually autonomous and has stubbornly resisted Dar es Salaam's efforts to achieve effective integration. Nyerere has gradually been gaining control over the island's foreign affairs and--only recently--over the Communist-trained army, but he has always been reluctant to intervene in the island's internal affairs. In the past year, however, the island has seen gross mismanagement, corruption, and economic stagnation. Karume has reacted to rising discontent by tightening security, making arbitrary arrests, and issuing decrees that impinge on Dar es Salaam's prerogatives.

25X6 Nyerere may finally have reached the end of his patience and decided on a show of force. There is no indication that he intends to depose any of the Revolutionary Council []--virtually all of whom are in the pay of one or more Communist countries--but the speed and tight security of the operation are bound to have impressed them. The unpopular council has never sought a formal mandate, but Nyerere may eventually feel confident enough to call an island election. []

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Costa Rica: Government officials have confirmed a \$5 million coffee sale to the Soviet Union.

Costa Rican trade with Eastern Europe has so far been negligible, despite annual rumors of pending "deals" with the Soviet Union that would lead to the establishment of a Soviet commercial or diplomatic presence. The foreign minister has denied in this case that the sale has any "strings attached." Costa Rica broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1948.

The cash sale, in dollars, cuts the expected large coffee surplus by about a third and will ease the country's serious balance-of-payments deficit.

Both El Salvador and Guatemala, the other major Central American coffee producers, have also made sales to Eastern Europe this year. [REDACTED]

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Australia: Prime Minister Gorton's impressive parliamentary victory in a wide-ranging no-confidence debate on 19 November could influence him to hold elections early next year.

Gorton and Defense Minister Fairhall displayed great vigor and skill in defending the government in its first major test since Gorton took office last January. The administration--which was attacked by the opposition Labor Party on virtually all issues related to foreign, defense and domestic policies--made its most dramatic point by making public a decision in principle taken last September to retain Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore through 1971. The no-confidence motion was defeated by a 67-35 margin.

The press, which recently has been highly critical of the administration on such issues as F-111 purchases and failure to clarify defense policy, almost universally agreed that the performance of opposition leader Gough Whitlam was inept and that Gorton was at his best.

This acclaim should strengthen Gorton's popular image, and may influence him to hold elections earlier in the year rather than as scheduled in November 1969.

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Malaysia: Moderate leaders of the Communist-penetrated Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) believe they will be able to force a change in the party's course at a central committee meeting next month.

They are preparing manifestos that denounce Communism and approve Sarawak's inclusion in Malaysia. SUPP has previously been dominated by extremists who were opposed to such inclusion. Moderate leaders will argue that SUPP, as the major political vehicle of Sarawak's Chinese population, must gain acceptance from other parties as a non-Communist organization and as a coalition partner, and must also win acceptance from Kuala Lumpur as a loyal opposition. The alternative is to remain in permanent and ineffective opposition.

Moderates, who include the party chairman, believe that party extremists have been significantly weakened both in the central committee and throughout the organization as the result of recent arrests and public revelations of Communist influence in SUPP. The long-known collaboration of many SUPP branches with the clandestine Sarawak Communist organization has further discredited the party.

Moderates are confident that they can dictate the new party line to the central committee and that the working-level cadre--even though still heavily infiltrated--will follow the moderates' initiative. Presumably, they hope that a non-Communist line would improve party prospects in both state and national elections next year, not only in the Chinese community but among non-Chinese groups as well.

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Turkey: The widely advertised leftist-sponsored "campaign against imperialism," aimed primarily at the US, appears to have fizzled.

The symbolic nationwide student boycott was to have lasted from 1 to 20 November, but it never really got off the ground. The boycotts that were attempted when school first opened this fall have, with few exceptions, ended.

The "march against imperialism" that was to have been made from the Black Sea port of Samsun to Ankara first ran short of funds and finally collapsed on 9 November while still some distance from the capital. Only a few hundred of the predicted 20,000 marchers actually participated in the uneventful ceremony at the Ataturk Mausoleum in Ankara on 10 November. The march apparently broke up when an attempt was made to display anti-NATO and anti-US placards.

The "anti-imperialist week" scheduled for 17-24 November and the leftist youth seminar scheduled at the Middle East Technical University on 18-23 November apparently have all but foundered for lack of interest and support.



The only item remaining on the campaign "agenda" is a planned demonstration, probably in the form of an anti-Vietnam and anti-CIA rally, to be staged upon the arrival of the new US ambassador-designate to Turkey.

Recent statements by leaders of both the government and the opposition appear to have

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dampened student enthusiasm for such extracurricular political activity. They also underscored the dangers inherent in further clashes between extremist elements of the left and right. Internal dissension within the Marxist-oriented Turkish Labor Party may also be causing some confusion within the political left, where many are awaiting clarification of the party's leadership and program before becoming further involved in political action. [REDACTED]

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NOTES

Mali: There are still no signs of any meaningful resistance to the coup executed by junior army officers on 19 November, and the country appears to be generally calm. Ousted President Keita reportedly has been taken into custody as the roundup of selected old regime leaders continues. The inexperienced young officers comprising the new 14-member junta almost certainly have no clear political program. Preliminary indications suggest, however, that they will shift Mali, which has had close ties with the Communist world since becoming independent in 1960, to a less radical course. [REDACTED]

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Sierra Leone: Prime Minister Stevens has declared a nationwide state of emergency and for the second time has postponed parliamentary by-elections in two key strongholds of the political opposition. His action probably stemmed from concern that growing tribal extremism threatened to engulf his regime. Heated politicking between the country's two political parties has inflamed the two main tribes against each other. Violent clashes have occurred, and discontent in the army--itself divided along tribal lines--has again surfaced. [REDACTED]

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UK-Rhodesia: African members will probably press Prime Minister Wilson at the Commonwealth meeting in January to withdraw his proposal, made during recent negotiations with Salisbury, to grant Rhodesia independence without majority rule. Such efforts are likely to fail, in part because Wilson believes his position has a majority of popular and parliamentary support. Meanwhile, the British will probably play a waiting game, hoping that pressure will develop within Rhodesia for a settlement on Wilson's terms, which require an external safeguard for the political rights of Rhodesian blacks. Such pressure is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future, however. [REDACTED]

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